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Abstract
This article considers the relationship between “hashtag activism” as it is 
currently being used by the alt-right and the tendency to draw on conspiracy
theory that Richard Hofstadter identified as being prevalent among what he 
termed “pseudo-conservatives” half a century earlier. Both the alt-right and 
Hofstadter’s “pseudo-conservatives” can be characterized by a pronounced 
populist nationalism that understands its aims as protecting a particular way 
of life whilst drawing on an aggrieved sense of injustice at being conspired 
against by an unseen enemy. That this “enemy” is typically foreign in 
actuality or in spirit confirms the cultural dimension on which their politics is 
played out. It is argued here that this paranoid populist nationalism has 
been figuratively drawn upon in the rhetoric of Donald Trump and that this 
apparent openness to the “pseudo-conservative” discourse on nationalism 
has provided a bridging effect via which far right elements are seeking to 
normalize extremist viewpoints.
Keywords: alt-right, conspiracy theories, hashtag activism, pseudo-
conservatives, Richard Hofstadter, Donald J. Trump, Twitter, white 
nationalism
Kellyanne Conway’s phrase “alternative facts” has already passed into 
notoriety; the Counselor to the U.S. president used the phrase when 
defending statements relating to the size of Donald Trump’s inauguration 
crowd made by former Press Secretary Sean Spicer (Blake 2017). Whilst the
1
Wilson: #whitegenocide, the Alt-right and Conspiracy Theory
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
phrase was largely ridiculed by the “mainstream media” (MSM), their scorn 
is unlikely to have had much impact on significant sections of Trump’s 
support. Not only is the MSM trusted by less than a third of U.S. citizens 
(Swift 2016), but there has been a resurgence of the acceptability of 
conspiracy theory, or “the paranoid style” as it was described by Richard 
Hofstadter during the 1960s. In his essay published in Harpers, Hofstadter 
described the “dispossessed” feeling that characterized the right wing of 
American politics in 1964. Indicative of the current state of political 
discourse, half a century later Alex Jones, founder and frontman of the 
conspiracy clearing house Infowars.com, claimed that he was one of the first
people that Donald Trump spoke to in his capacity as president (Haberman 
2016). Trump has ridden a wave of populist dissent into the White House 
and has done so using rhetoric drawn from recent conspiracy theory. The 
conspiracy theories publicly embraced by Trump include the idea that 
climate change is “a Chinese hoax” (Trump 2012), that Barack Obama is not
a U.S. citizen (Krieg 2016), Barack Obama as the founder of ISIS (Siddiqui 
2016), vaccines cause autism (Trump 2014), and Muslims celebrated the 
9/11 attacks en masse in New Jersey (Kessler 2016).1  This latter 
convergence of conspiracy, ethnicity, and populist politics encapsulates the 
scope of this article. This article will also examine the shared conceptual 
spaces of populist politics, conspiracy theory and the role of the Internet in 
1 It is worth noting Pasek et al’s (2016) study that connected belief in the “birther” 
conspiracy with anti-Black sentiment. 
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facilitating the mainstreaming of the paranoid style. By looking at far right 
communications strategies within the conspiracy milieu, it will be shown that
the presence of conspiracy theories in the public sphere has allowed white 
nationalist discourse to gain increased exposure. It should be noted that the 
primary concern here is to concentrate on the effect on public discourse of 
demonstrably untrue conspiracy theories. That these types of conspiracy 
theories currently proliferate and determine much of the discussion should 
not deflect from efforts to uncover the very real conspiracies that often 
accompany statecraft and political maneuvering; Russian interference in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election is testament to that. Rather, the focus here is
on those conspiracy theories that were formerly marginal and stigmatized 
due to their lack of verifiability.
Theories of Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy theory thrives in an environment of secrecy and necessarily
so. Without the possibility of there being a mechanism by which any plot 
might be hidden there would be no opportunity to postulate the kind of 
hidden malevolent plots that fuel conspiracy theories. So, secrecy and 
conspiracy theories are not unrelated phenomena. Certainly, this is not the 
only causal factor in the production of conspiracy theory but, in general 
terms, a poverty of information can be understood to be productive of a 
tendency to “fill in the gaps” in a simplistic and reductive manner. This is, in 
3
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essence, the motive behind Fredric Jameson’s (1988, 356) well-known 
description of conspiracy theory as “the poor person's cognitive mapping in 
the postmodern age; it is a degraded figure of the total logic of late capital.” 
In Jameson’s reading, class-based barriers to opportunity for knowledge 
acquisition and the development of critical reason are the limiting factors 
that reproduce information poverty. More typically, the extension of state 
mechanisms for the production, classification, and suppression of 
information are understood to be the primary factors in the development of 
the current conspiracy milieu. Whilst this atmosphere of secrecy contributes 
to a conspiracist tendency, as will be seen, status insecurity, fragile 
economic wellbeing, and global economic developments also contribute. 
Secrecy does not automatically produce conspiracy theories, or, 
indeed, entail actual conspiracies. Daniel Hellinger (2003) quite rightly 
describes a number of scenarios in which the use of secrecy by the state or 
special interest groups may be required operationally, to facilitate frank 
discussion, or to protect national interests. All of these may be pursued 
legitimately in secret. However, they become conspiratorial when they 
operate outside of agreed frameworks or subvert the democratic process 
(Hellinger 2003). It should be noted here that conspiracy theorists can 
perform a valuable role; their investigative skepticism offers a vital challenge
to the concealment or reduced circulation of information whilst also 
challenging the assumptions that contribute to the definition of “the national 
4
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interest.” As such, they can provide a means for redressing the 
asymmetrical balance of power that state secrecy contributes to (Maret 
2016). Conspiracies do happen and are facilitated by an opaqueness in 
corporate and state business. It is easy enough to identify any number and 
discussion of conspiracies in the field of U.S. politics would only be 
controversial in selecting a single example over other possibilities: the 
Tuskegee syphilis experiment, Project MKULTRA, the assassination of JFK, 
Watergate, or the Iran–Contra affair might all merit consideration and bring 
to light distinct forms of information control. In an environment in which 
secrecy abounds, and in which conspiracies are shown to occur after the 
fact, it should be unsurprising that the public is ready to speculate about 
current conspiracies. However as Fenster (2008) points out, the proliferation
of conspiracy theories and the staggering diversity and likelihood of their 
claims makes it difficult to assess the veracity of conspiracy claims. This, in 
turn, allows conspiracy theory to serve multiple political ends as a result of 
this indeterminacy: the hidden enemy is always secretly at work to 
undermine and destroy “our” way of life and that “we” must stand together 
to oppose “them.” Oliver and Wood’s (2014, 964) study of conspiracy theory
belief found that within the U.S. adult population:
Not only does half of the American population agree with at least one 
conspiracy from a short list of conspiracy theories offered, but also 
large portions of the population exhibit a strong dispositional 
inclination toward believing that unseen, intentional forces exist and 
that history is driven by a Manichean struggle between good and evil. 
5
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The readiness to believe in a hidden, Manichean battle as a hidden 
hand in the passage of history indicates a susceptibility to the kind of 
manipulation via conspiracy narratives outlined by Fenster. Nonetheless, 
Fenster (2008) situates conspiracy theory as a response to the development 
of a monopoly on information and the production of “truth”; he is, 
ultimately, a celebrant of the kind of agency that the production of 
conspiracy theory offers. In this analysis, it is a way out of Jameson’s 
information poverty motivated by a suspicion of the secret state. Fenster 
(2008, 278 ) concludes his book with a narrative voice that is an unclear 
convergence of his own and the narrator of the 9/11 “truther” documentary 
Loose Change, a move he suggests is empowering to viewers bereft of their 
own, clear voices, which 
gives the viewer meaning and agency, and offers a sense of adventure
and fun as she attacks the stodgy, conspiratorial state with the latest 
information technology and Web portals. And the conspiracy 
community is the collective response that can rally the people and 
restore the nation. The truth movement, composed of great scholars 
and regular kids with laptops, can overcome. 
Fenster captures the seductive power of contemporary conspiracy theory, 
leaving open the possibility of a politically mobilized community of “web 
researchers” enriching their cognitive maps and breaking down barriers to 
“true” knowledge. As if in recognition of the lack of criticality, this ending 
suggests an afterword that recognizes the limited opportunity for conspiracy 
6
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theory to grow into a structured and productive politics that can, “organize 
and respect people in the complex, diverse world that it simplifies” (Fenster 
2008, 289). 
Fenster makes an attempt to understand conspiracy theory as a 
search for agency in an information economy in which access to knowledge 
production is ostensibly limited, but can be extended and challenged by the 
communicative strategies of the Internet. Fenster’s work, in its first edition 
(1999), was an important intervention that captured a moment 
characterized by an organic upswell of political awareness. Here Barkun 
(2003) offers a useful summary of the value of the Internet to the 
conspiracy theorist. Barkun highlights the value of an open medium of 
communication that is free from gatekeepers to conspiracy theorists. Unlike 
the MSM’s capacity to regulate and assess the quality of knowledge 
production, the Internet offers conspiracy theorists the opportunity to 
circulate their ideas freely without fear of their theories being dismissed as 
spurious, “stigmatized knowledge subcultures are at a distinct disadvantage 
as far as mass media are concerned […] Consequently, those whose 
worldview is built around conspiracy ideas find in the Internet virtual 
communities of the like-minded” (Barkun 2003, 13). Nonetheless, that does 
not diminish widespread tastes for MSM treatments of conspiracy theory and
within the cultural sphere the entertainment industry has exploited a 
generalized atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. The most significant 
7
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recent works on conspiracy theory bear witness to this and Knight (2000), 
Goldberg (2001), Barkun (2003), and Fenster (2008) all point to the 
influence of the television series The X-Files (1993-) in expanding public 
knowledge of conspiracy theory whilst drawing its popularity from an 
environment of distrust. The stuff of The X-Files is standard conspiracy fare. 
It depicts a complex and hidden world in which a shadow government 
operated behind the scenes and conspired against its citizens and, in its 
most dramatic sweep, humanity as a whole. The program’s slogan “The 
Truth is Out There” featured in the title sequence, epitomizes the troubled 
relationship with “the truth” that is currently experienced by the subject in 
late modernity. The truth is “out there” in the sense that it is always 
somewhere else, hidden in the general welter of the information, concealed 
behind disinformation or hidden, restricted from the public.2 For Goldberg 
(2001, 256), this outlook typifies a historical moment in which an actively 
maintained veil of secrecy separates state and citizenry. He describes “a cult
of secrecy [that] has dominated the bureaucracy in Washington and 
distanced federal authorities from those beyond the beltway,” and that this 
commitment to secrecy-in-the-name-of-security has proliferated and 
accelerated in the post-WWII period so that its maintenance has now 
become more “reflex” than “necessity” (Goldberg 2001, 256).  Moreover, 
this culture of secrecy has proven fertile ground for the genesis and growth 
of conspiracy theory. In Goldberg's (2001, 257) words, 
2 One X-Files episode was tellingly titled “All Lies Lead to the Truth.”
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Concealed information denied accountability and enabled the arrogant 
both to ignore public opinion and to manipulate it. Behind this veil, 
laws were broken and democratic values subverted […] Even without 
the taint of malevolence, suppression of information aroused concern 
[…] Drawing sustenance from America’s resilient fear of centralized 
authority, perceptions of sinister design became truth.
This phenomenological correspondence between conspiracy and 
innuendo is key here, especially where it is coupled with a population 
increasingly disconnected from a central authority and experiencing 
perceptions of social and economic disempowerment. Knight (2000) also 
depicts a labyrinthine architecture of secrecy characterizing the American 
state as it developed during the Cold War. He describes a “sprawling 
intelligence community” comprised of “the CIA, the National Security 
Council, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, 
Army Intelligence, Navy Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the FBI” (Knight 2000, 28). Knight’s (2000, 29) reading of 
this proliferation of the secrecy-oriented state is similar to Goldberg’s and he
finds that this “official obsession with secrecy, in effect, helped fuel the 
popular fixation on conspiratorial secrets at the heart of government.” 
Knight’s analysis suggests that contemporary America is experiencing a 
“culture of conspiracy” in which the widespread intelligence community is 
generative of a dispersed and generalized fascination with secrecy and 
occulted machinations. As will be noted below, it is from this position that he
9
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dismisses Hofstadter’s narrow focus on conspiracy as being the purview of 
extremists. Knight is right to draw attention to the extent that this culture of
conspiracy can be the groundswell from which a healthy critical mindedness 
emerges. However, it should also be acknowledged that there is an 
increased acceptance of a politics that was once considered to be extreme 
but which, concurrently with conspiracy theory, is becoming increasingly 
mainstream. As this article suggests, this concurrence is beyond 
coincidence; it is a consequence of the extent to which far right usage of 
conspiracy theory has become so thoroughly interwoven in the conspiracy 
milieu as to ensure that an articulation of current conspiracy theories is to 
evoke political positions on the extreme right, wittingly or not.
Conspiracy Theories and the Radical Right
The coincidence of belief in conspiracy theory and extremist politics is 
widely noted in the literature (e.g., Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 2000, Gardell 
2002, Goodrick-Clarke 2003, Durham 2007). Both tend to share an 
apocalyptic structure in which communal ontologies are threatened by 
external forces; typically, in both instances, these forces are hidden and 
their threat to the extremist/conspiracy theorist’s community is realized 
through secondary agents and secret plots. Richard Hofstadter’s scene-
setting and frequently maligned essay “The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics” paints a picture of the conspiracy theorist’s self-appointed role as a 
protector of a world threatened by the machinations of hidden conspirators. 
10
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Whilst there are conspiracy theories that can be seen to be written 
from a left-wing perspective, it is the political right wing that has come to be
more readily associated with the production and belief in conspiracy 
theories. This is not surprising. The political right are, generally speaking, 
socially and culturally conservative with an ongoing association with 
“traditional values” so the belief of a secret adversary – be it Satan, 
communism, the Illuminati, the New World Order or whomever – that is 
plotting to radically transform society’s values is a clear threat to a 
conservative mindset. Here, then, conspiracy is understood as Barkun’s 
recursive “super conspiracy” implemented to bring about an apocalyptic 
endtime. This paper contends that the political extremity of white 
nationalism seeks to play on the fear of an adversarial “hidden hand” in 
order to provide a platform from which to normalize their politics of hate. In 
this, Richard Hofstadter’s work is of continuing value in the analysis of far 
right discourse and provides an explanatory model for understanding the 
political right in the U.S. This will be done in the context of the use of the 
Twitter hashtag “#whitegenocide.” 
In 2011, Gary Kamiya wrote a piece titled, “The Infantile Style in 
American Politics” for Salon. In it, Kamiya argued that Hofstadter’s essays 
“The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt – 1955” and “Pseudo-Conservatism 
Revisited – 1965” provided a way of understanding the Tea Party movement 
within the Republican party. A year earlier the left-leaning conservative 
11
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blogger Andrew Sullivan (2010) wrote a similar but shorter piece titled 
“Trying To Understand The Tea Party II” for his blog. Both writers drew on 
Hofstadter’s distinction between “pseudo-conservatives” and “genuine 
conservatives” and this distinction will be useful to the current examination 
of the right-wing populism evident in Donald Trump’s recent election and the
emergence of the so-called alt-right.
Not without controversy, Hofstadter’s two essays concerning the 
“pseudo-conservative” political tendency in the U.S. give an account of the 
nationalism and prejudice present within U.S. populism from the late 
Nineteenth Century onwards. Foreshadowing current populist formations, he 
identified a conspiratorial outlook within these populist movements. The 
origin of the conspiracy was, typically, European bankers and, on occasion, 
Jewish bankers working with foreign powers or for themselves. Hofstadter 
identified jingoistic and anti-Semitic tendencies in the populist US People's 
Party of the 1890s. His portrayal of them is complex but he was generally 
well-disposed toward them, seeing them as “mild radicals” who targeted the 
monied elites of their day. Although there was contestation over the extent 
to which status anxiety was a motivating factor for the Populists (Collins 
1989), in Hofstadter's analysis the primary motivation was economic anxiety
with status anxiety a secondary factor as is made clear in the 
correspondence cited by Collins. Nonetheless, status anxiety is 
acknowledged as being a contributory factor and Hofstadter expands upon 
12
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the contribution of status anxiety to populist anti-intellectualism in the 1950s
in the essay “The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt” (1955, in Bell 1963).  The 
prejudice described by Hofstadter in this essay has value to the current 
discussion in its depiction of the American political situation of the 1950s. 
The essay starts with Hofstadter reflecting upon the situation of a generation
that had been forged in the “liberal dissent” of the 1930s that had led to the 
New Deal. Hofstadter suggests that by the time of writing this generation 
had retained their liberal inclinations but had become politically 
conservative; in a condition of relative affluence, they had a desire to retain 
the advantages that the prevailing order provided them. He contrasts them 
to the group he identified as the dominant radical force of the time, the 
pseudo-conservatives. He draws on Adorno et al’s (1950) study of the 
authoritarian personality.
Adorno and his co-researchers initially sought to determine causal 
factors in an individual’s development of anti-Semitic beliefs but broadened 
their concerns to try and understand the formative influences contributing to
a generalized susceptibility to an ethnocentric, authoritarian outlook. The 
study is methodologically flawed (something Hofstadter acknowledges in the 
later essay, “Pseudo-Conservatism Revisited – 1965”), but it formulates an 
emerging tendency in post-War US politics that, it is argued here, 
characterizes the “right wing identity politics” of the alt-right and recent 
formations within white nationalism. Adorno distinguishes between “genuine 
13
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conservatism” and “pseudo conservatism” by characterizing the former as a 
perceived protection of “positive” conservative values and a vision of 
America as a land of opportunity for all within the terms of democratic 
capitalism. The latter contains elements of that aspirational narrative but 
they are overshadowed by a rigidly hierarchical ethnocentric framing of it. In
effect, opportunity is only available to certain in-groups. From Adorno (1950,
182),
The ethnocentric conservative is the pseudo conservative, for he 
betrays in his ethnocentrism a tendency antithetical to democratic 
values and tradition [...] his politico-economic views are based on the 
same underlying trends—submission to authority, unconscious 
handling of hostility toward authority by means of displacement and 
projection onto outgroups, and so on—as his ethnocentrism [...] This 
is not merely a "modern conservatism." It is, rather, a totally new 
direction: away from individualism and equality of opportunity, and 
toward a rigidly stratified society in which there is a minimum of 
economic mobility and in which the "right" groups are in power, the 
outgroups subordinate. Perhaps the term "reactionary" fits this 
ideology best. Ultimately it is fascism. 
The level of contestation over Hofstadter’s position on Populism 
reflects the level of disagreement among historians about this movement. 
Johnston (2007) outlines much of this discussion but asserts that Hofstadter 
was correct to assert the presence of reactionary voices in Populism whilst 
acknowledging that they sat uncomfortably alongside voices that were 
forerunners of the Progressive movement that was to follow. Johnston’s 
point is simple: that U.S. populism incorporates a variety of stances in its 
criticism of the established order. Certainly, these stances include 
14
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democratic perspectives that seek to promote the realization of the 
aspirations of all Americans but, at the same time, anti-semitism and a 
belligerent nationalism were also present,
[T]he Populist moment of the 1890s bequeathed to its various populist
successors a suspicion of elites and a taste for conspiratorial 
explanations that have at times nurtured antisemitism and other forms
of bigotry. (Johnston 2007, 133)
More well-known and equally apposite here is Hofstadter’s study of 
conspiracy theory “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” Effectively a 
survey of conspiracy theory in American culture and politics and a brief 
study of the John Birch Society (JBS), it shaped subsequent scholarly 
discussion of conspiracy theory by situating the “paranoid” beliefs of the JBS 
in a long-standing – if inchoate – tradition of alternative explanations for 
social, political, economic, and cultural change. Like Hofstadter’s 
commentaries on the differing modalities of conservatism this essay has had
a lasting legacy but has attracted criticism. Typical of recent criticism is 
Fenster’s charge that Hofstadter pathologizes conspiracy thinking. Fenster 
(2008, 8) suggests that Hofstadter contrasts conspiracy thinking with a 
“healthy” approach to politics, and “he implied that conspiracy theory 
constitutes a malady or affliction.” Despite his otherwise excellent study, 
Goldberg (2001) goes further in this reductionist reading of Hofstadter; his 
reading of “the paranoid style” is wholly grounded in the idea of Hofstadter 
as a diagnostician. He writes,
15
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Hofstadter donned the white coat of a clinician. Conspiracy theorists 
were marginal men and women whose personality disorders caused 
them to project their problems, status grievances, and wounds into 
public affairs. (Goldberg 2001, xi)
Goldberg continues in this vein and uses the language of a “clinician” to 
emphasizes his charge against Hofstadter: “cure,” “contagious,” “infect,” 
“fever.” This is all hyperbolic; this shibboleth needs laying to rest. Hofstadter
himself is careful to make clear he is not using the term in its full medical 
sense but rather as an analogy suggestive of a tendency to identify 
otherwise indiscernible threats to the “normal” run of things. It is 
characterized by the conspiracy theorist’s production of fear of hidden 
agency subverting a way of life. Hofstadter (1964, 77) is clear on his 
avoidance of the medical implications that the term might otherwise 
indicate:
I am not speaking in a clinical sense, but borrowing a clinical term for 
other purposes. I have neither the competence nor the desire to 
classify any figures of the past or present as certifiable lunatics. In 
fact, the idea of the paranoid style as a force in politics would have 
little contemporary relevance or historical value if it were applied only 
to men with profoundly disturbed minds. 
Nonetheless, despite this clarity caricatures like Goldberg’s persist. 
Peter Knight’s (2000, 31) discussion of Hofstadter also confines him to the 
clinical metaphor, insisting that Hofstadter produces a “diagnosis of a 
thoroughgoing paranoid delusion,” and goes on to suggest that Hofstadter 
“insisted” that the paranoid style is “a minority phenomenon” (Knight 2000, 
16
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36), but again, this needs to be addressed because it undermines the 
opportunity to draw on Hofstadter’s analysis in order to better understand 
times to which it is suited, including our own.
Hofstadter does describe the “spokesman” [sic] of the paranoid style 
as being marginal but here his ascription of a marginal status does not 
downplay the seriousness of his discourse. This marginality is better 
understood as being reflective of Daniel Bell’s (1963) suggestion that the 
U.S. radical right represented a “dispossessed” constituency. As discussed 
above, Hofstadter contributed essays on the “pseudo-conservatives” to Bell’s
collection; he also refers to Bell’s own essay in “The Paranoid Style in 
American Politics.” Here, he is quite clear that the right wing tendency in 
which he identifies a proclivity for the use of the paranoid style is subject to 
social rather than psychological stresses, “but the modern right wing, as 
Daniel Bell has put it, feels dispossessed: America has been largely taken 
away from them and their kind, though they are determined to try to 
repossess it” (Hofstadter 1964, 81). Thus, marginality in this instance 
reflects a social status. It is worth quoting at length from Hofstadter in order
to restore this social dimension to understandings of his work in current 
academic work on conspiracy theory. What is key in the following is that 
Hofstadter does not condemn “the paranoid style” to the marginalia of 
history but, quite correctly, acknowledges its capacity to command influence 
in periods of generalized anxiety regarding social status or economic 
17
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security. He writes that while a tendency to subscribe to a conspiracy view of
history may be seen to be,
[M]ore or less constantly affecting a modest minority of the 
population. But certain religious traditions, certain social structures 
and national inheritances, certain historical catastrophes or 
frustrations may be conducive to the release of such psychic energies, 
and to situations in which they can more readily be built into mass 
movements or political parties. In American experience ethnic and 
religious conflict have plainly been a major focus for militant and 
suspicious minds of this sort, but class conflicts also can mobilize such 
energies. (Hofstadter 1964, 86)
It is clear here that Hofstadter, in his conclusion, is warning of the risk of the
spread of “paranoid rhetoric” from the perennial social margins into the 
mainstream. In this he is not far off the analyses of the more recent 
commentators who have, generally, sought to dismiss Hofstadter. Aupers 
(2012) takes this tack and, without offering any evidence, introduces a 
suggested Freudian dimension to Hofstadter’s undeserved reputation as a 
diagnostician of aberrant political views. Aupers’ dismissal of Hofstatder’s 
work typifies the recent tendency to attempt an ostensibly more considered 
approach to conspiracy; similar approaches can be found in Knight (2000), 
Fenster (2008), Robertson (2015). As such, it is worth exploring a little 
further. Aupers’ argument is that Hofstadter’s diagnostic approach is 
predicated on an assumption that conspiracy theory represents a dangerous 
challenge to the consensus politics preferred by Hofstadter. Aupers (2012, 
23) contends that Hofstadter, along with Daniel Pipes (1997) and Fredric 
Jameson (1991) reflect “the ideology of modern Enlightenment,” and 
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produce a simplistic and inaccurate division between the rational modern 
subject and the irrational pre-modern alternative, echoing Weber’s 
disenchantment thesis. Following Peter Knight (2000), he sees this as 
approaching the status of a moral panic about the decline in public reason 
and suggests that, instead, conspiracy theory reflects a more generalised 
suspicion of authority and loci of power, “‘Paranoia’ is no longer simply a 
diagnostic label applied by psychologists and psychiatrists but has become a 
veritable sociological phenomenon” (Aupers 2012, 23).
This has become something of a common assumption in academic 
treatments of conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theory is increasingly treated as
a commonplace disposition that typifies a diminished public capacity to apply
reason and a falling away in trust between citizens and the state. However, 
within this, there are variations on this theme. Clarke (2002) considers the 
“attributional error” implicit in conspiracy to have potential value with 
conspiracy theorists’ activities creating pressure on state agencies to operate
in a more open manner. Indeed, the academy may do well to listen to his 
suggestion that, “The conspiracy theorist challenges us to improve our social
explanations. If a nonconspiratorial social explanation is better articulated as
a result of the challenge of a conspiracy theory then that is all to the good” 
(Clarke 2002, 148). However, he is wrong to diminish the risk that 
conspiracy theories present. Clarke (2002, 148) suggests that "few are 
actually harmful,” but it needs to be acknowledged that a conspiratorial 
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theory of history was a contributor to the spread of anti-Semitism in Europe 
during the early part of the Twentieth Century. Cohn (1966) and Bronner 
(2000) provide a reminder of the influence of The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion had during the Nazi era. Moreover, in line with other works (Barkun 
2003, Wilson 2017) Bronner underscores the continued utility to the far right
that The Protocols provides. 
Following Michael Rogin’s (1967) earlier work, Fenster (2008) divides 
academic commentaries on conspiracy thinking into two camps, symbolists 
and realists. The division is organized around the idea that academic writing 
about conspiracy theories generally serves two purposes: symbolists reflect 
centrist countersubversion and realist interest in conspiracy theory lies in 
delineating the ideological use of conspiracy theory by elite groups. Like 
Rogin, Fenster describes Hofstadter as a symbolist and, rightfully, praises his
approach for situating conspiracy theories in their historical social, economic,
and political contexts but, tiresomely, does so in the “Hofstadter as clinician”
vein. Fenster (2008, 51) criticises realists for their, “too-quick dismissal of 
conspiracy theory as a popular political practice,” and that their 
concentration on the instrumental uses of conspiracy theory obscures the 
initial circumstances that led to the politicisation of the advocates of 
conspiracy theory in the first place. This is certainly true but, equally, 
Fenster is overly hasty to err on the side of caution and extend the benefit of
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the doubt to conspiracy theorists in the name of open-mindedness. Fenster 
(2008, 90) writes that
[C]onspiracy theories may be wrong or overly simplistic, but they may 
sometimes be on to something. Specifically, they may well address 
real structural inequities, albeit ideologically, and they may well 
constitute a response, albeit in a simplistic and decidedly unpragmatic 
form, to an unjust political order, a barren or dysfunctional civil 
society, and/or an exploitative economic system. 
This is undeniable but by constructing and then writing dismissively of 
the so-called realist approach he diminishes the capacity to recognize that in
the overly simplistic forms that conspiracy thinking can take there is a 
danger that the simplification produces potentially dangerous divisions within
society. Whilst Fenster is right to highlight the capacity for conspiracy 
thinking to bring to light the grievances of a community it does not follow 
that this necessarily legitimizes conspiracy thinking as a reasonable 
response. As will be demonstrated, the danger in linking populism and 
conspiracy theory that Hofstadter outlines does pose an opportunity for 
potentially violent extremists to exploit and radicalize popular dissent. 
Fenster is not alone in seeking to limit the perception of threat associated 
with conspiracy thinking. Similarly, Knight (2000) plays down the adversarial
conspiracist outlook that Hofstadter delineated in pseudo-conservatives and 
the John Birch Society. Instead, Knight (2000, 75) insists that what was 
once the domain of the radical is now a mainstream reticence to extend trust
or belief, 
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Paranoia is no longer necessarily the mark of right-wing demonological
extremism […] it has become a default attitude for the post-1960s 
generation, more an expression of inexhaustible suspicion and 
uncertainty than a dogmatic form of scaremongering.
Knight suggests that the populist, white right-wing forms of conspiracy 
thinking had become dissipated and indistinguishable from those shared by 
other social groups. He does this in a discussion of The Turner Diaries 
(1978), a race war fantasy novel written by the founder of the National 
Alliance, William Luther Pierce, under the pen name Andrew Macdonald. The 
novel depicts a guerrilla war waged by white nationalists in a future in which 
whites are routinely persecuted in a Jewish-run United States. Knight’s 
analysis suggests that this is a response to the diminished position of the 
white working class within an economic and political context that has made 
equivalent the lives of all working people by destabilizing working class jobs 
and creating an equality of precariousness. Knight (2000, 42) writes, 
the increasing competition for diminishing social resources amongst 
so-called minority groups leads to mutual suspicions between the 
disinherited […] even the white Anglo male establishment now seeks 
to redefine itself as an embattled minority interest group in the face of 
a larger conspiracy group. 
Furedi (2005) also embraces this model of an increased mainstreaming
of conspiracy theory as marking a particular mode of subjectivity. He frames
this as a crisis in agency, writing, “No one is as they seem. This 
normalization of suspicion and mistrust does not possess any critical 
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dimension. Agency panic represents the fear that the vulnerable subject 
bears towards an incomprehensible changing world” (Furedi 2005, 86). What
is distinct in Furedi’s (2005, 86) analysis is that whilst he embraces the 
generalised position he is still quite clear that conspiracy theory represents 
an analytical failure, describing it as a “simplistic worldview,” that, “displaces
a critical engagement with public life with a destructive search for the hidden
agenda.”
Barkun’s (2003) detailed survey of American conspiracy culture in the 
new millennium recognized this generalized mistrust of traditional 
institutions and channels of communication. Nonetheless, whilst recognizing 
that a conspiracy view of history is present on both the left and right wing he
is clear that how this outlook is made manifest is quite distinct in each 
instance. So, for example, in a discussion of the shared aspects of New 
World Order conspiracies he notes that those on the left are fearful of a 
restriction of rights and freedoms whilst those on the right are more likely to
frame their conspiracy theories in terms of a direct persecution of 
themselves and their political allies. Barkun (2003, 72) writes, “the right […]
became obsessively concerned with the risk of their own incarceration.”  
The theme of persecution by a socialist “New World Order” is a well-
established one on the right. Pat Robertson’s (1991) use of this theme is 
well-documented and formed the basis of his book The New World Order. 
The book spent weeks in The New York Times non-fiction bestsellers list 
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during November and December 1991. This popularity led Michael Barkun 
(1996) to describe it as one of two dominant factors behind the 
mainstreaming of populist nationalist conspiracy theories during the 1990s. 
The other factor he cited was the active presence on the Internet of the 
Militia movement; in the case of the Militias, he observed the commingling of
conspiracism with Robertson’s millenarian apocalypticism leading to a 
fervent urgency within their outlook. Thus, the conspiracism that was spread
by members and sympathizers of the Militia movement was marked by an 
eschatological right wing outlook and it was this that characterized the 
mainstreaming of conspiracy theory as an actual phenomenon as opposed to
the more general skepticism characterized by fictional forms such as The X-
Files. Barkun (1996, 61) observed that “beliefs once consigned to the 
outermost fringes of American political and religious life now seem less 
isolated and stigmatizing than they once did.” This observation is developed 
by Nigel James (2001) in a chapter examining the Militia/Patriot movement’s
use of the Internet. In this, he also draws on Zygmunt Bauman’s (1998, 
1999, 2001) work on the erosion of prior sureties of identity by the 
dissolution of closed cultural systems brought about via relatively easy 
access to rapid intercontinental travel and global communications networks, 
particularly the Internet. Like Oliver and Wood (2014), James notes the 
tendency within the conspiracy milieu for conspiracy theorists and their 
followers to exhibit a pronounced Manichaeism in their worldviews. Following
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Bauman, he suggests that this becomes coupled with a retreat into a 
belligerent nationalism as a defense against the unbearable freedom to 
endlessly recreate the self that characterizes postmodern identities. It is, 
nonetheless, an ambivalent nationalism that accentuates loyalty to “the 
nation” but this is qualified by the mistrustful antagonism toward the state 
found within conspiracism. James (2001, 83) provides a useful reminder that
the recursive interlinking of websites and Internet-based methods of 
communication produce a virtual proximity in beliefs that are otherwise 
marginalised: “the occultist/UFO/Egyptologist/quasi-religious vortex of belief
systems [is] never more than a few clicks away from a neo-Nazi or Christian
Identity website.”
The Internet, #whitegenocide and the Radical Fringe
The Internet has provided an ideal medium for the dissemination of all 
manner of stigmatized knowledge and provided fringe groups and beliefs a 
potential audience that far exceeds the network of self-published magazines,
fairs and speaking opportunities that Colin Campbell (1972) described as 
“the circuit” by which the cultic milieu recruited during the 1970s. Whilst the 
content of the message being circulated may be analogous, the reach of 
fringe voices via global communication media exceeds the audiences in town
halls and mail order publications by several magnitudes. Barkun (1996, 
2003) raises this point, and returns to it in his consideration of the 
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prevalence of conspiracy themes in Donald Trump’s campaigns for 
Republican presidential candidate and U.S. President (Barkun 2017). In this 
short essay, Barkun reinforces his earlier point regarding the capacity for the
Internet to amplify the voices of the bearers of stigmatized knowledge. He 
points to the capacity the web gives for republishing the same material on 
any number of platforms (or spamming as it is more usually called), also for 
the Internet to provide those with a little technical savvy to present their 
ideas in a polished manner that belies their fringe origins, and also the 
opportunity for “securing pseudo-credibility” (Barkun 2017, 438) by being 
linked to be a more credible, mainstream source. In particular, though, he 
pays heed to the capacity for Web the 2.0 platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook to accelerate the process of what he calls “the mainstreaming of 
the fringe” (Barkun 2017, 441). Barkun identifies the Trump’s use of former 
Breitbart executive chair Steve Bannon as strategist in his campaign and 
presidency as a clear sign of a more generalised acceptance of far right 
fringe beliefs in the political mainstream; he describes Bannon and his 
connection with the alt-right as providing, “a bridge to the fringe” (Barkun 
2017, 440). He might equally have mentioned Trump’s conversations with 
Alex Jones. 
The Trump campaign was galvanized by support from the “alt-right”. 
The alt-right is a relatively recent political formation within U.S. right wing 
circles. Whilst sharing some of the social conservativism of the religious 
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right, the alt-right is marked by a comparative youthfulness and a radicalism
in its racial politics. It is also marked by a nebulousness that prevents an 
easy ideological mapping and it is notable that its amorphousness can be at 
least attributed to its origins in the anonymous Internet message boards, 
4chan and 8chan. There is a willed boundary pushing that tests freedom of 
speech in a progressive liberal environment; “political correctness” is one of 
the alt-right’s bugbears and the ludic nihilism of troll culture in 4/8chan has 
been given some political grounding by the alt-right. In this, #Gamergate is 
a clear precedent of the alt-right in its coupling of online trolling and 
reactionary attitudes to gender roles. Similarly, the exhortations to 
“transgress” made by Milo Yiannopoulos is clearly a targeted attack on the 
liberal values that have influenced sections of the U.S. mass media and 
national politics for the last decade. Although the rapid ascendency of the 
alt-right has precluded the opportunity for an extended academic literature 
certain thematic similarities have begun to emerge. Barkun (2017, 439) is 
unequivocal in his description of the alt-right and notes that despite being “a
somewhat ill-defined label comprising white separatists, both anti-Semitic 
and non-anti-Semitic.” Rosenfeld echoes this, but goes further in her 
characterization of the radical nature of the alt-right incursion into the 
mainstream. She views this fringe as proto-fascistic and a danger to the 
future of the U.S., and writes, “Bannon regards his revolution - a ‘global Tea 
Party movement’—as a quintessentially spiritual movement that will return 
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the West to its ancestral ('Judeo-Christian') culture” (Rosenfeld 2017, 13). In
doing so she purposefully invokes Mussolini and her essay proliferates with 
justified references to the Fascistic leanings and influences apparent in the 
alt-right movement. Civil rights activists and the Southern Poverty Law 
Center detail a number of the celebratory statements made by notable 
figures on the alt-right in the wake of Trump’s victory (Piggott 2016). Many 
of these are expressed in ethno-nationalist terms confirming the alt-right’s 
grounding in diverse white nationalist groups. 
As has been detailed elsewhere, one of the unifying cornerstones of 
white nationalist ethno-nationalist is a millenarian conspiracism (Wilson 
2012, 2017). Wilson (2017) provides evidence of the purposeful use of the 
Twitter tag #whitegenocide by users of the white nationalist web forum, 
stormfront.org. During the multiple ISIL terrorist attacks on Paris on the 
night of November 13, 2015 forum members posted messages encouraging 
readers to use the hashtag in tweets relating to the attacks. The messages 
provide a clear account of white nationalist use of Twitter as a means of 
amplifying their politics of hate by association with trending political events. 
The phenomenon of hashtag activism has attracted some academic attention
and most of it has been laudatory in the strategic use of hashtags to counter
normative narratives of race, ethnicity, and racialized (in)justice, 
predominantly on Twitter (Yang 2016; Bonilla and Rosa 2015; Cumberpatch 
and Trujillo-Pagán 2016). Yang (2016, 15) also notes the capacity for the 
28
Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/1
shared use of the #BlackLivesMatter to allow a creative communality of 
shared experiences to join together disparate experiences of injustice 
through a shared narrative form and, “create a collective story of struggles 
for racial justice.” Bonilla and Rosa (2015) also note the collective endeavor 
that links hashtag activists but also draw attention to the extended reception
these creative acts are afforded. Even though the replies and retweets may 
have been challenging or critical, they note the capacity for the #Ferguson 
to mobilize attention to ongoing and widespread injustice in America:
Within this context, social media participation becomes a key site from
which to contest mainstream media silences […] social media users 
were able to show that “#Ferguson is everywhere”—not only in the 
sense of a broad public sphere but also in the sense of the underlying 
social and political relationships that haunt the nation as a whole. 
(Bonilla & Rosa 2015, 12)
Quite rightly, Bonilla and Rose, as with Yang and others, point to the 
potential for hashtag activism to disrupt normatively regulated flows of 
information and to counter the institutional power structures represented by 
the mainstream media. However, as Barkun (1996, 2003, 2017) has shown, 
the open structures that allow the progressive use of the Internet and social 
media also provides an opportunity for reactionary voices to attempt the 
same. Thus, the communal effects of #BLM and the disinterring of concealed
racial “haunting” by #Ferguson are employed by the alt-right through 
#whitegenocide and other white power hashtags.
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The following section explores current use of the hashtag and shows 
how text mining Twitter can enhance understanding of the situated use of 
#whitegenocide hashtag to further strengthen the bridge between the fringe
and the political mainstream as described above. Twitter’s popularity clearly 
offers users a platform from which to address an extensive audience with 
328 million monthly active users of whom 70m are American, this represents
just under a quarter (24%) of all online American adults (Statista 2017). 
Although Twitter limits its archival database, text mining is able to 
make use of resources made available through Twitter search APIs 
(Application Programming Interface). In this instance, the free R statistical 
environment (R Core Team 2017) was used for the analysis. Additional R 
packages were used for Twitter API interaction (Gentry 2015), text mining 
(Feinerer & Hornik 2017), topic modeling (Grün & Hornik 2011), and 
visualization (Wickham 2009, Fellows 2014). 10,000 tweets using the 
#whitegenocide were filtered using text parsing to remove common words 
that added little to the character of the tweets (conjunctions, prepositions, 
pronouns and so forth). A frequency matrix which was used to further filter 
words used less than 100 times. From here a wordcloud was generated to 
provide an at-a-glance reference of the 50 words most frequently used in 
tweets flagged with #whitegenocide.
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At the heart of the wordcloud are the two opposing terms in the white 
nationalist imaginary: white(s/ness/people/race) and diversity. The two 
poles in the white identitarians’ Manichean divide between purity and 
plurality. What is also striking is the presence of a number of prominent alt-
right Twitter users: @wginfonetorg (White Genocide Info), @ladyaodh (Ann 
Kelly “European rights activist”), @punishedrabbit1 (Jess Lynn, the number 
“1” is omitted from the wordcloud as numbers are not included in the term 
matrix), @savwhitechildre (SaveWhiteChildren). The latter is a clear 
reference to the “14 words” of mystic white supremacist David Lane, “We 
must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children” 
(cited in Michael 2009, 43). The presence of these usernames among the 
most frequently used terms indicates the capacity for individual users to 
shape hashtag usage on Twitter. The audience reach of these users is also 
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instructive. The following maps indicate the geographic distribution of the 
followers of the three most overtly white supremacist of these users.
Map of followers for user White Genocide Info. Location of user 
estimated from linked Web site registrar information.
Map of followers for user Kelly Ann. Location of user estimated from 
linked website registrar information.
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Map of followers for user Save White Children. Location of user 
estimated from linked website registrar information.
Although their locations are varied the three most notable 
#whitegenocide posters all provide a link to a homepage offering white 
supremacist propaganda. The distribution of their audience is broadly 
comparable with roughly 70% of their followers based in the U.S. and in 
the cases of White Genocide Info and Kelly Ann a European following of 
roughly 18%. Save White Children has a slightly smaller European 
following (11.8%) and a more pronounced South American following. It 
must also be recognized that only a small percentage of their following 
provide a geographic location and so the maps above are limited in their
scope. For instance, only 2.2% of Kelly Ann’s c.26.5 thousand followers 
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provide a location that was identifiable by the R source code, TwitterMap
(Leek 2011). Nonetheless, the broad point is that if there is an equal 
distribution of users providing geographic locations, in all three 
instances their potential audiences are global. 
The word cloud procedure was repeated with the usernames of the
individual removed from the term matrix. This brings a sharper focus on
the variety of terms most frequently associated with the #whitegenocide
as can be seen below:
Three of the five third tier terms (after the Manichean binary, “white” 
and “diversity”) are hashtags: #WhiteLivesMatter, #StandUpForEurope, 
and #MAGA. The first two are alt-right activist hashtags whilst the latter
is President Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again.” 
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#MAGA is a close tie for the fifth most frequently paired term with 
#whitegenocide. The following chart demonstrates the frequency 
distribution of terms used in more than 200 #whitegenocide posts from 
the sample.
Other frequently occurring hashtags include #tcot (“Top 
Conservatives on Twitter”) and #pjnet (“Patriotic Journalists Network”). 
The strategy here is clear. #whitegenocide is being repeatedly used in 
proximity to more mainstream hashtags as a mechanical means to 
effect the bridging from the fringe to the mainstream outlined above. 
Trump is a clear conduit and it is no great surprise that he features in 
the 50 terms most frequently associated with #whitegenocide. His 
prevarications on matters of race and his relationship with the alt-right 
have ensured that the bridge to the mainstream continues to be 
available to the fringes of the right wing. A frequency analysis of terms 
most frequently associated with #maga in the dataset of tweets 
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featuring #whitegenocide shows the following to be the most frequently 
associated terms:
tcot whitepow
er
natsoc ccot trump altrig
ht
hate pjnet
.58 .57 .56 .43 .41 .40 .37 .33
There is a clear divide in these between overtly radical rights stances 
and the more traditional conservative right but the location of #maga 
and Trump vacillate between the two and are revealed as the bridges 
between the mainstream and the fringe described in Barkun. For clarity, 
these can be organized in the following table:
Traditional Right Bridging 
Terms
Radical Right
#tcot (Top 
Conservatives on 
Twitter)
#ccot (Conservative 
Christians on 
Twitter)
#pjnet (Patriot 
Journalists 
Network)
#maga 
(“Make 
America 
Great 
Again”)
Trump
#whitepower
(#)natsoc (National 
Socialism)
#altright
hate
Echoing the division between “genuine conservatives” and 
“pseudo-conservatives” made by Hofstadter, Barkun’s fringe increasingly
find ways into the mainstream of American politics and shift the 
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discourse of conservatism in a more radical direction. As was indicated 
above, in the conclusion of “The Paranoid Style” Hofstadter (194, 86) 
warned of the susceptibility of the capacity for conspiracist rhetoric to be
“built into mass movements or political parties.” Wittingly or not, 
Trump’s rhetoric has galvanized the radical right as they set their sights 
on mainstream acceptance.
Concluding Comments
The compounding and expansion of state secrecy during the Cold 
War and the War on Terror produced an era of mistrust and generalized 
suspicion described by Fenster, Knight, and Aupers. Not unreasonably, 
they signal conditional approval for the skepticism toward loci of 
power/knowledge within the modern state and globalized corporate 
entities that conspiracy theory represents; although their approval is 
tempered by the more outré claims of fringe conspiracy theories. 
Nonetheless, the dismissal of Hofstadter’s work as an operation in 
clinical diagnosis has correspondingly resulted in an unpreparedness for 
the exploitation of this “culture of conspiracy” by the radical fringe. It 
should be noted here that conspiracies do exist and that conspiracy 
theories are not the preserve of the political right. Covert actions are, 
arguably, a necessary part of statecraft but their distinction from 
conspiracies is determined only by the legitimacy of the power that is 
exerted in their enaction. At the same time, fanciful accounts of the 
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secret exertion of power to achieve grand, malevolent ends abound. 
What is of note in our moment is the spread of conspiracy theories into 
the mainstream. In their turn to conspiracy theory, the radical right 
have conformed to the “diagnosis” made by Hofstadter.
To return to Hofstadter’s article on the paranoid style, it is notable that
he dedicates a subsection to the paranoid spokesman’s habit of “Emulating 
the Enemy.” Among the Ku Klux Klan, anti-Communists, anti-Catholics, and 
anti-Masons’ reproduction of the tactics or organisational structures of their 
perceived enemies, Hofstadter (1964, 85) also describes how “the John Birch
Society emulates Communist cells and quasi-secret operation through 
"front" groups, and preaches a ruthless prosecution of the ideological war 
along lines very similar to those it finds in the Communist enemy.” The 
parallels with the alt-right’s reproduction of #BlackLivesMatter in its 
reversed form as #WhiteLivesMatter is clearly a maneuver in this tradition 
and might be understood to represent a desire to emulate and claim a 
parallel creative community to the one described by Yang (2016). Although 
this simple mimicry is more redolent of the fragile desperation with which 
the alt-right seeks a consistent, communal “white” identity than it is of a 
developed political strategy. Nonetheless, political progressives would be 
well advised to dismiss the continued hashtag activism of the alt-right at 
their peril. Whilst this article was being completed President Trump gave a 
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public speech to a crowd in Warsaw, Poland ahead of the G20 Summit in 
Hamburg, Germany. He told the crowd,
The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will 
to survive? […] Do we have the confidence in our values to defend 
them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our citizens to 
protect our borders? Do we have the desire and the courage to 
preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and 
destroy it?” (Thrush & Davis 2017, §6)
Trump’s association with the alt-right leaves little room to doubt that 
his “West” is a white West. His rhetoric is at once that of the paranoid 
spokesman trafficking “in the birth and death of whole worlds, whole political
orders, whole systems of human values. He is always manning the 
barricades of civilization” (Hofstadter 1964, 82). Certainly, Huntington’s 
(1993, 1996) clash of civilizations casts a long shadow over this rhetoric, but
in light of the enmeshed hashtags, the proximity of the alt-right to the White
House, and Steven Bannon’s strategic role, it is not unreasonable to suppose
there will be an audience for Trump’s words that hears not Huntington’s 
influence in Trump's words, but that of William Pierce, David Lane’s 14 
words, or #whitegenocide. 
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